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Reflections on a decentralized approach to transitional 
justice in the DR Congo  
Valerie Arnould
After decades of conflict, state violence and 
widespread impunity, recent political 
changes in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo seem to be creating renewed 
prospects for the establishment of 
transitional justice processes. President 
Tshisekedi has signalled his interest in 
creating such processes, while local 
activists and the UN mission in the DRC 
are using this opportunity to further press 
their long-standing demands in this area. 
This policy brief is inspired by discussions 
that took place at a workshop organised in 
January 2021 in Kinshasa by civil society 
groups to outline what transitional justice 
in the DRC should look like. While many 
important points were discussed on this 
occasion, one interesting question that was 
raised was whether it might be feasible and 
appropriate to engage in decentralised 
approaches to transitional justice. This 
brief aims to contribute to this reflection by 
outlining the three forms that such 
decentralisation could take – minimal, 
maximal and grounded – and how it might 




After a long slumber, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) seems to be reawakening 
to the possibility of transitional justice to 
address the country’s heavy, decades-long legacy 
of mass human rights violations. At a meeting of 
the Council of Ministers in August 2020, 
President Félix Tshisekedi called for the 
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, 
a statement which he reiterated in his address 
before the United Nations General Assembly a 
month later. Subsequently, two decree proposals 
for the creation of a national commission on 
transitional justice and a reparations fund for 
victims were drafted by the Congolese Minister 
of Human Rights (although, at the time of 
writing, these have not been officially adopted). 
As far back as 2017, the National Justice Reform 
Policy defined strengthening measures to 
combat impunity for international crimes as a 
central objective. At the same time, in its 
September 2020 report on the UN mission in 
the DRC (MONUSCO), the organisation urged 
the Congolese government to adopt a national 
transitional justice strategy. Progress in 
combatting impunity has also been defined as a 
key benchmark against which to assess decisions 
about MONUSCO’s progressive withdrawal 









The DRC has a chequered past when it comes 
to transitional justice. As part of the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord adopted in 2002, 
several transitional justice measures were slated 
for creation, but these either failed to materialise 
(vetting of the security forces, a Special Tribunal 
for the DRC) or were unable to carry out their 
work effectively (the truth and reconciliation 
commission). Since then, efforts have been 
made, with the support of international donors, 
to strengthen the capacity of domestic courts to 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of mass 
human rights violations. This has included 
support for judicial and legislative reforms, 
capacity-building of military courts, the 
operationalisation of a mobile courts system, the 
establishment of a Prosecution Support Cell 
programme, and investigations by the 
International Criminal Court. 
 
Notwithstanding some important progress that 
has been made, an overall climate of impunity 
for human rights violations persists and victims 
have received little recognition or redress for the 
harm suffered. Repeated cycles of unconditional 
rebel-military integration processes and the 
adoption of amnesty laws have embedded 
impunity in the security sector. Attacks and 
human rights abuses by rebel groups also remain 
rife in various parts of the country despite 
several rounds of peace agreements and rebel 
disarmament and demobilisation processes. The 
extremely unstable political and security 
situation in the country has led to considerable 
unwillingness to press hard on the accountability 
issue, over concerns that it would threaten the 
DRC authorities’ hold on power or undermine 
peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts by 
international actors. In 2014, a draft law to 
create special chambers within the Congolese 
judiciary system was rejected by the National 
Assembly (and quietly opposed by some 
donors), and no action was taken to implement 
the recommendations contained in the UN’s 
report mapping human rights violations 
committed between 1993 and 2003. 
 
However, recent changes in the DRC’s political 
environment seem to be opening up a new 
window of opportunity for transitional justice. 
As a result, we are witnessing a revival of 
discussions about the prospects for transitional 
justice in the country. At a recent expert 
workshop in Kinshasa convened on this topic 
by several Congolese civil society organisations, 
one interesting issue that arose was the 
desirability and feasibility of adopting a more 
decentralised approach to transitional justice.  
By and large, it is not an overstatement to say 
that “transitional justice is usually wholly 
national in origin and function”. From its 
inception, transitional justice has been conceived 
of as state-sponsored mechanisms which involve 
the creation of formal, national-level institutions 
(whether they be trials, truth commissions, 
reparations programmes, vetting processes or 
institutional reforms). Although the concept of 
transitional justice has broadened over time to 
encompass community-level processes as well, 
the idea of transitional justice as a fundamentally 
national process persists. However, growing 
criticism of the effectiveness of the ‘classic 
pantheon’ of transitional justice mechanisms in 
effecting the promised change on the ground 
warrants a questioning of this centralised 
approach to transitional justice. So far, though, 
there has been limited reflection on what exactly 
a decentralisation of transitional justice might 
entail. In this policy brief, I suggest that there 
are three ways in which we might view a 
decentralised approach to transitional justice, 




At a minimal level, decentralisation can simply 
mean that a national transitional justice 
institution creates decentralised units to carry 
 
 





out its operations on the ground. For instance, 
the truth commission in Peru set up multiple 
regional offices to carry out the work of 
collecting testimonies, carrying out 
investigations, drafting reports and conducting 
sensitisation and education campaigns. Brazil, in 
turn, set up an innovative decentralised process 
of hybrid truth-telling and reparations in the 
form of ‘Amnesty Caravans’: these caravans 
were travelling public hearings and memory 
sessions organised by the Amnesty Commission 
to hear and review applications for 
compensation and amnesty from victims of 
political persecution under Brazil’s military 
regime.  
 
In the DRC, such a decentralised approach to 
transitional justice has existed to some extent in 
the past. The Commission Nationale Vérité et 
Reconciliation (CNVR), set up in 2004, 
provided for the creation of local and provincial 
committees. These were to be tasked with 
collecting testimonies and amnesty applications, 
consulting with local stakeholders and making 
recommendations for reconciliation ceremonies. 
However, funding shortfalls, the politicisation of 
the commission and a lack of political will 
scuppered the overall work of the CNVR, which 
ended up closing its doors in 2006 without 
having been able to carry out any investigations. 
If a new truth commission were to be 
established in the future, the possibility of 
organising travelling hearings could be 
considered as an additional dimension of 
decentralising the activities of the commission. 
 
The mobile courts and the Prosecution Support 
Cell (PSC) programme can also be seen as 
operating along more decentralised lines. Mobile 
courts seek to improve the delivery of justice in 
the conflict-affected regions of eastern Congo 
by bringing trial processes directly to the 
communities affected. Prosecution Support 
Cells, in turn, have been established in several of 
the country’s provinces: at the request of 
military justice authorities, international experts 
detached to the PSCs are deployed to provide 
technical and logistical support for the 
investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. 
 
Building on these experiences, minimal 
decentralisation could involve the creation of special 
investigative units at provincial/regional level to deal 
with past crimes rather than the creation of a 
national-level Special Court for the DRC. This 
option was already put forward with the 2004 
draft bill on the Special Chambers; therefore this 
proposal could be revived, with a few 
amendments to address the legal concerns that 
were raised in 2004.1 The usefulness of such an 
approach has been demonstrated in other 
countries. For instance, in Chile, the decision to 
create a special division of the Investigations 
Police and to appoint judges with an exclusive 
or preferential mandate to investigate mass 
human rights violations committed during the 
military dictatorship played a key role in 
accelerating prosecutions for past crimes. Along 
similar lines, in Northern Ireland, a new 
investigation unit was established in 2005 under 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (the 
Historical Enquiries Team) with the mandate to 
reopen and re-examine cases pertaining to 
deaths related to the Troubles between 1968 and 
1998. A decentralised special investigation and 
prosecution structure of this kind could coexist 
with the efforts that have been made to develop 
a national ‘stratégie de priorisation des 
poursuites des crimes internationaux’, though 
due consideration should also be given to the 
usefulness of allowing a provincial/regional-level 
definition of such prosecutorial prioritisation 
strategies. 
 
Given the vastness of the DRC’s territory (and 
the practical constraints on inter-provincial 
travel for the average Congolese) and the diverse 
experiences of conflict in the country, the 
 
 





inclusion of such a minimal decentralised 
approach to transitional justice seems to be a 
pre-requisite. Any national-level transitional 
justice mechanism that may be set up will need 
to decentralise some of its operations to 
provincial or territoire level in order to ensure its 
accessibility, feasibility and legitimacy. While 
concerns about insecurity in certain areas of the 
country, and fears that decentralisation might 
devolve into a process of ‘empty post creation’, 
might make some hesitant to support such 
decentralisation, an entirely centralised 
transitional justice is unlikely to be effective in 
the Congolese context. 
 
MAXIMAL  DECENTRALISATION  
A second, probably more challenging, approach to 
decentralisation is to engage in transitional justice 
activities without the creation of a unified or 
centralised transitional justice policy or institutions. 
While there has been a growing interest in 
community-based transitional justice activities,2 
maximal decentralisation involves a broader 
conception of the ‘localisation’ of transitional justice. 
This is because it would also mean that transitional 
justice institutions traditionally established at national 
level (trials, truth commissions, reparations etc.) 
would be established at sub-state level. These sub-
state transitional justice processes would not 
necessarily be tied to a national transitional justice 
framework and they would operate in relative 
independence of each other. The transitional justice 
landscape in the country would then resemble a 
mosaic, in contrast to the tree-like structure of the 
minimal decentralisation model. 
 
Such a practice of maximal decentralisation of 
transitional justice has been uncommon so far, 
and the idea that developing a national 
transitional justice strategy constitutes ‘good 
practice’ is prevalent in the transitional justice 
field. At the Kinshasa workshop, much 
emphasis was similarly placed on the need for 
the government to formulate a National 
Transitional Justice Policy as a first step. There 
is undoubtedly a value to this, such as the needs 
to clarify the goals a country is pursuing through 
transitional justice, to ensure coherence and 
complementarity between transitional justice 
processes (in particular where a country opts to 
pursue a comprehensive approach to transitional 
justice), and to guarantee that the component of 
state acknowledgment of the violent past is 
realised through transitional justice. However, 
there are also various factors that suggest a 
maximal decentralisation of transitional justice 
in the DRC may be pertinent. 
 
A first factor is that there is no uniformity in 
conflict dynamics and experiences in the 
different regions of the country. While there are 
some important overlaps and dynamics of 
national and regional security and insecurity, the 
DRC’s conflict landscape also resembles an 
elaborate patchwork quilt. Recent research 
suggests that differences in conflict experiences 
and community dynamics (such as the degree of 
social trust and the presence of demobilised 
combatants in the community) influences 
people’s perceptions of justice. The 
configuration of conflicts can also strongly 
influence perceptions of victimisation, which in 
turn influence people’s transitional justice 
preferences as well as how inter-community 
trust and social cohesion can be rebuilt. Because 
the nature and experiences of conflict are very 
diverse in the DRC, it is questionable whether a 
single, unique approach to transitional justice, 
which is defined at the national level, can 
adequately address the variety of conflict 
experiences and the needs for justice that flow 
from it. An added element here is that the long 
time frame of the conflicts in the DRC,3 and the 
fact that human rights violations are ongoing, 
creates a situation in which it seems unlikely that 
 
 





a single transitional justice approach will be able 
to address all the past and current human rights 
violations. 
 
The importance of engaging in context-sensitive 
transitional justice has been recognised in the UN, 
EU and AU policy frameworks on transitional 
justice. Generally, this is understood to mean that we 
should refrain from simply exporting a ‘transitional 
justice model’ from one country to the next. In a 
broader sense, it has also been understood to require 
that transitional justice policies are designed with 
consideration of the institutional, political and 
socioeconomic context in which these institutions 
will operate. I would suggest, though, that a context-
sensitive approach to transitional justice may also 
mean that we should not follow a one-size-fits-all-
approach within a same country. Engaging in a 
maximal decentralisation of transitional justice may 
contribute to making these processes more sensitive, 
and therefore better able to respond to people’s 
localised experiences of conflict and victimisation. 
 
A second factor to consider is that in certain 
contexts decentralised transitional justice 
processes may be more achievable than the 
creation of national institutions. Where there is 
resistance on the part of national elites to 
transitional justice, parts of a country are not yet 
fully pacified, there is a low level of trust of 
citizens in state institutions, or the level of 
polarisation between communities remains very 
high, national transitional justice processes often 
find themselves blocked, ineffective or highly 
politicised. This consideration is particularly 
relevant in the case of the DRC, where 
transitional justice advocates have been waiting 
for close to two decades now for ‘the right 
political and security context’ to emerge before 
engaging on the path of transitional justice. Yet, 
that ‘right time’ is ever elusive. And in the 
meantime, victims’ justice needs remain 
unaddressed and impunity rampant. Shifting the 
focus from a national approach to transitional 
justice to a maximal decentralisation approach 
might make it more feasible to finally set in 
motion some transitional justice processes. 
Moreover, a maximal decentralisation will make 
it easier to devise specific transitional justice 
processes that are adapted to both the specific 
needs of victims and what is feasible in 
particular context (for instance, because of 
differences in the security environment, what is 
feasible on the transitional justice front in the 
Kasais may not be the same as in Ituri or South 
Kivu). By delinking transitional justice from 
national state institutions, the former processes 
might also benefit from greater legitimacy 
amongst the population. 
 
A third consideration is that the process of 
drafting a national transitional justice policy in 
the DRC could be protracted and allow for 
many partisan interests to weigh in on outlining 
what transitional justice will (be allowed to) be. 
It also risks building an overly rigid framework 
for transitional justice that stymies innovation - 
yet it is widely recognised that transitional justice 
works at its best when sufficient room is left to 
either tweak existing models to local context or 
when societies/communities come up with 
innovative processes to address context-specific 
needs. Finally, if the purpose pursued through 
transitional justice is not only accountability but 
also conflict resolution, prevention, and 
rebuilding social relations (which were oft-cited 
objectives at the Kinshasa workshop), then 
national-level institutions might not be the most 
effective at achieving these. Research on 
interpersonal trust, for instance, strongly 
suggests that activities which facilitate direct 
personal contact and involve close physical 









A maximal decentralisation of transitional justice 
might take on different forms in the DRC. It 
could involve the establishment of transitional 
justice institutions at the sub-state level rather 
than at the national level. To deal with the 
human rights violations committed in the 
context of the Kamuina Nsapu crisis in Central 
Kasaï (2016-2018), consultations were held 
between the UN joint human rights office 
(UNJHRO), the Kasai provincial authorities and 
victims. These have resulted in suggestions for 
the creation of a provincial truth and 
reconciliation commission and reparations 
programme. An approach like this, at provincial 
level, would offer the opportunity to develop 
transitional justice institutions that respond to 
the particularities of the Kasai conflict context 
and, according to some, can facilitate the 
integration of local conflict reconciliation and 
community dialogue traditions to ensure that the 
transitional justice processes have a cultural 
resonance and legitimacy. The applicability of 
such province or region-specific approaches to 
transitional justice could be explored for other 
areas of the country affected by conflict. 
 
However, it is important to ensure that the 
creation of such provincial-level institutions 
occurs within the legal bounds of the DRC 
Constitution. Furthermore, because conflict 
dynamics in Central Kasai or other Congolese 
provinces are never purely local, it would be important 
to ensure that provincial-level transitional justice 
institutions also examine the broader drivers and 
impacts of these conflicts. Thus the Kasai truth 
commission would need to be given an explicit 
mandate to investigate the local, cross-provincial 
and national drivers and impacts of the conflict 
and have the authority to collect evidence or 
testimonies beyond the Central Kasai provincial 
boundaries (which links back to the question of 
what legal authority such a commission can have 
under the Congolese Constitution). 
 
Maximal decentralisation can also mean that 
instead of seeking to establish central 
institutions or a national transitional justice 
strategy, much room is left for ad hoc 
government initiatives, grassroots processes and 
civil society organisations to pursue particular 
objectives, such as improving community 
relations,4 addressing the socio-psychological 
harm suffered by victims and combatants or 
addressing structural inequalities that are drivers of 
conflict.5  It could also involve encouraging and 
supporting community-led documentation 
activities instead of seeking to establish a formal, 
national-level truth commission.6  Such an 
approach can be particularly useful in the light of 
recently outlined plans for a renewed decentralised 
disarmament, demobilisation, and community-
reintegration process (the DDRCS). While the draft 
legislation has not yet been adopted, the current 
version of the bill expressly states an intent to 
integrate transitional justice in the DDRCS.7 For 
successful community re-integration of former 
combatants, the provision of psycho-social and 
economic support measures are necessary but 
insufficient interventions. It is equally important 
to invest in projects that work on personal 
reconciliation and on rebuilding social ties and 
trust, which in turn means that victims’ needs 
have to be addressed alongside those of 
combatants. Setting up transitional justice activities 
alongside DDR processes – such as reparation measures, 
baraza intercommunautaires and other community justice, 
memory or reconciliation activities, perpetrator apologies, 
etc. – thus has the potential to facilitate community 
reintegration. While such a coordination between 
transitional justice and DDR can happen at the national 










While these multiple initiatives would operate 
with cognisance of the others to avoid undue 
duplication, there would be no overarching 
coordination structure or authority. This is 
based on the recognition that different types of 
stakeholders have something unique to bring to 
the table and that since victims’ needs are 
diverse and not fixed in time, a diversity of 
approaches needs to be deployed in order to 
effectively address these needs. A bureaucratic 
drive for coordination and centralisation is often 
a go-to strategy amongst donors and transitional 
justice advocates, but it might not always be the 




A third way in which to conceive of a 
decentralised approach to transitional justice 
draws on calls for more bottom-up and 
participative transitional justice processes. It has 
been observed that while transitional justice 
discourse places much emphasis on victims, 
transitional justice practice has in fact been 
focused more on the state than the victims. State 
players, not victims, have been the central agents 
in the design and creation of transitional justice 
mechanisms. Furthermore, state interests such 
as rebuilding the rule of law, promoting political 
reconciliation and stability or strengthening state 
authority, legitimacy and institutions – have 
often been prioritised as the objectives that 
transitional justice should achieve. The growing 
bureaucratisation, legalisation and 
institutionalisation of transitional justice has 
further contributed to the development of an 
increasingly rigid framework of how transitional 
justice should operate and what gets accepted as 
constituting transitional justice. The United 
Nation’s promotion of a conceptualisation of 
transitional justice based on the four pillar 
structure (right to justice, right to truth, right to 
reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence) 
has further reinforced this. The result of these 
developments is that, all too often, an overly 
legalistic and normatively prescriptive approach 
to transitional justice dominates, which hampers 
efforts to devise either victim-centred or 
context-sensitive approaches to transitional 
justice. It has also progressively led to an 
approach to transitional justice that focuses on 
rights rather than on needs. 
The question of whose voice is heard in the 
process of designing transitional justice policies 
and institutions and on the basis of what 
knowledge this happens is not anodyne. At 
present, the politics of knowledge production on 
transitional justice is such that local voices, 
victims’ voices and the voices of those with 
lived experience of the conflict or repression are all 
too often overwritten by the voices of state and 
international actors. A grounded decentralisation of 
transitional justice would therefore entail a re-
centring of the victim and creating spaces for 
the reassertion of victim’s agency in transitional 
justice processes.8 Not only would this realign 
the practice of transitional justice with its stated 
aim, but it would also contribute to 
strengthening the social and cultural legitimacy 
of transitional justice practices and our ability to 
align transitional justice to context-specific 
needs. 
 
A grounded decentralisation thus requires an 
identification of how transitional justice should 
be implemented that is based on victims’ own 
definitions of needs and conceptions of what 
justice entails and how it can be realised – and 
not from a normative positioning on what 
transitional justice should be. The point of 
departure has to be the impact that the violence 
and human rights violations have had on victims 










In practice, engaging victims in transitional 
justice processes has taken the form of 
organising consultations with victims or carrying 
out opinion surveys prior to the establishment 
of a transitional justice process or institution. 
While these are certainly important endeavours 
and more transitional-justice focused 
consultations with victims in the DRC would be 
welcome, consultations are not a sufficient form 
of participation. This is because they tend to 
limit victims’ inputs to the pre-establishment 
phase (consultations to identify victims’ needs) 
or after the completion of transitional justice 
processes (consultations to assess the impact of 
transitional justice). In other words, they do not 
allow victims to participate actively in decisions 
and negotiations about the creation and 
operationalisation of transitional justice 
mechanisms. The fact that victims’ needs change 
over time make the lack of participation of 
victims throughout the entire life cycle of 
transitional justice processes particularly 
problematic. 
 
When poorly designed, consultation can also be 
limited in the amount of space it leaves for 
culturally specific understandings of notions 
such as ‘justice’ or ‘truth’ to emerge or for 
linking justice with socioeconomic needs. This is 
further reinforced by the common practice of 
merging sensitisation campaigns and 
consultations, as the former can strongly orient 
the viewpoints that will be expressed in the 
latter. Finally, consultations can also result in a 
homogenised representation of victims’ voices 
by paying insufficient attention to how context, 
the nature of civilians’ relations with 
combatants, and the nature of their experience 
of violence and victimisation can lead to a 
differentiation in victims’ needs. 
 
In a grounded decentralisation approach, placing 
victims at the centre of transitional justice 
processes thus means giving them a direct stake 
in outlining the aims, scope and implementation 
of these processes. It also entails being sensitive 
to not imposing a particular transitional justice 
language. For instance, consultations might 
reveal that victims place a strong emphasis on a 
demand for ‘truth’. But their understanding of 
how truth provision can best happen will be 
culturally determined. It should therefore not be 
automatically presumed that the creation of a 
formal truth commission on the adversarial 
examination model or the public testimony 
model corresponds to their understanding of 
how ‘truth’ takes shape. Consultations should 
therefore take care to not impose preconceived 
transitional justice constructs and instead allow 
for cultural and contextual understandings of 
common transitional justice concepts to emerge.  
 
The Global Survivors Fund, which is setting up 
a pilot project in the DRC, offers an interesting 
example of an approach that seeks to set up a 
survivor-centric approach by leveraging support 
for reparations programmes that have been 
designed and initiated by survivors. If one is 
willing to think outside the box, a grounded 
decentralised approach could also mean, for 
example, that the definition of a national or 
provincial prosecutorial strategy as mentioned 
above engages with victims to generate a list of 
priorities, as well as bringing judicial players 
together to identify selection criteria.9 The core 
element for a more grounded decentralised 
approach is to enable victims to participate on 
their own terms at all stages of transitional 
justice processes and to have true agency in 
influencing decisions on transitional justice 
design and implementation, and even sometimes 
to have meaningful ownership of transitional 
justice processes. In addition, it also involves 
incorporating existing localised practices to 
 
 





respond to the consequences of human rights 




A window of opportunity seems to be opening 
up in the DRC to re-engage with transitional 
justice efforts to address the legacy of human 
rights violations resulting from decades of 
armed conflict and state repression. However, 
the country remains a difficult environment for 
transitional justice: violence continues unabated 
in eastern Congo, political stability is fragile, 
state capacities are weak, and the overall number 
of perpetrators and victims to deal with is high. 
It is therefore of primordial importance that 
efforts towards transitional justice are well-
thought out and adapted to the Congolese 
contexts and the specific needs of Congolese 
victims. A context-specific element that has 
been emerging from recent discussions amongst 
Congolese transitional justice advocates is the 
appropriateness and feasibility of decentralising 
transitional justice processes. This policy brief 
seeks to contribute to this reflection by 
proposing three forms of decentralisation 
(minimal, maximal and grounded) and how 
these could be implemented in the DRC.  
 
This brief has also presented the advantages that 
a decentralised approach to transitional justice 
might offer. However, there are also some 
obvious risks and challenges associated with 
such an approach. One important element is 
that decentralised processes are generally less 
effective at achieving structural change and 
ensuring that the state takes ownership of and 
responsibility for transitional justice. Specifically 
in the DRC context, there is also a risk that a 
decentralisation of transitional justice processes 
will lead to a neglect of the national and regional 
drivers of the conflict and enable certain parties 
in the conflict to evade responsibility. It may 
also contribute to increasing already existing 
tensions and political struggles between the 
central authorities in Kinshasa and provincial 
authorities. Lastly, weak state capacity is as 
prevalent at provincial and local level than at 
national level, and sometimes even more so. 
This may hamper the implementation of certain 
decentralised transitional justice approaches.  
 
However, it is important to remember that the 
choice is not necessarily between adopting 
exclusively one or the other approach for all 
transitional justice efforts. Some processes 
might lend themselves more to being 
implemented at the national level while others 
might operate better as decentralised processes. 
Engagement with transitional justice is also a 
long-term effort that lends itself to a step-by-
step or sequenced approach: turning towards 
maximal decentralised transitional justice 
approaches might help to kickstart certain 
transitional justice efforts that are too politically 
sensitive to be implemented at national level. 
For instance, starting up decentralised 
documentation efforts today does not close off 
the option to create a national truth commission 
at a later stage when levels of polarisation 
between communities have decreased and the 
security and political situation has improved. 
The two approaches can even co-exist. The 
most important thing will be for decisions about 
how to move forward on transitional justice in 
the DRC to be guided by a combined 
consideration of victims’ needs, ownership and 
appropriateness to the context, rather than by a 
rigid attachment to transitional justice principles 
or models. 
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1 One important point of contention was the hybrid nature of these chambers. However, such special chambers do not have to be 
mixed. Experience with hybrid courts in other countries has highlighted that their mixed composition is not a guarantee of the greater 
independence or effectiveness of these courts. The Special Chambers could thus be entirely Congolese with the provision of 
international technical support through an expanded PSC system.  
2 Grassroot initiatives continue to occupy a liminal place in transitional justice. Community-based initiatives are recognised as having a 
place in transitional justice, but they are often presented as having a ‘lesser’ position than formal TJ mechanisms and are required to 
conform to institutionalist rule-of-law principles. Initiatives led by non-state players are still not treated, by and large, as transitional 
justice mechanisms. 
3 It is politically sensitive to set an exact date for the start of the conflicts in the DRC, but it is safe to say that eastern Congo has been 
experiencing armed conflict for close to three decades. 
4 Experiences with local peace committees in eastern Congo would be a useful starting point. While these are peacebuilding 
mechanisms, it would be worth examining the integration of transitional justice considerations in their work (i.e. engaging in activities 
that are focused also on personal reconciliation, victim redress and perpetrator acknowledgement or apologies).  
5 A national transitional justice policy could be envisaged which does set out the objectives the country wants to realise through 
transitional justice, but which is not overly prescriptive in terms of the kind of institutions, processes or activities that will be set up to 
achieve these objectives and which expressly states that processes can be national, provincial, or local/community-based. 
6 Such documentation would be about more than collecting evidence on human rights violations by civil society organisations. It 
would also be about engaging in historical memory work at the (cross-)community level. Examples of such local-led documentation 
activities are the National Peace and Documentation Centre in Kitgum in northern Uganda or the Healing Through Remembering 
project in Northern Ireland. 
7 Article 19 of the November 2020 draft of the ‘Ordonnance Portant création, organisation et fonctionnement d’un service spécialisé 
dénommé « Coordination Nationales des Programmes décentralisés de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion socio-économique 
communautaire et stabilisation »’ (on file with the author). 
8 Fostering victim agency in and through transitional justice can in itself constitute an element of redress or remedy to victims 
9 For a broader perspective on using locally-produced indicators in peacebuilding policies, see 
https://www.everydaypeaceindicators.org/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
